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Redistribution with Sloth-Britain's problem?
Richard Jolly
Many if not most economic analyses of Britain's
economic difficulties suggest that slow growth is
at the heart of the problem-and an acceleration
of growth the obvious cure. Past experience in
Britain and in the Third World casts doubts on
this. Except for the last three or four years, per
capita growth rates in Britain since the war have
been almost as fast or faster than at any time
since the start of the industrial revolution. In
terms of unemployment, income distribution and
export-import balance Britain's post-war per-
formance has also been better than for most of
the last century.
Recent work on developing countries has shown
that poverty, employment problems, inequality,
foreign exchange difficulties and heavy inter-
national 'dependence' arise as much from the
structure and pattern of a country's development
as from its growth rate. Similarly, the eradiction
of these problems depends as much on structural
change as on growth. If this is true for poor
countties why not also for a country like Britain,
very much richer and mush more industrialised?
Instead of our somewhat naive faith in growth
and our short run monetarist or neo-Keynesian
preoccupations-should we not direct economic
policy much more explicity towards what is
needed to restructure the British economy in the
short and over the longer run? Such restructuring
would need to focus on a number of issues, but
the concepts of basic needs and national self-
reliance, approaches and priorities suggested in
analyses of Third World problems, interpreted
within the context of a still relatively rich, in-
dustrialised country, might provide helpful guide-
lines. It is not even clear that aggregate growth
has more than a minor part to play in the pro-
cess.
Britain's past economic performance
Since the industrial revolution began about two
centuries ago, the long-run pattern of British
economic development has been of very slow
but relatively steady growth. There was little or
no redistribution, except for the major and very
important reduction in inequality between the
slump of the 1930s and the establishment of the
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welfare state by the mid 1950s.1 The distinctive
tong run characteristic of the British pattern has
been creeping growth rather than creeping social-
ism.
The long-run trends in British growth can be
judged by the rates of increase of real GNP over
the 30 years periods, shown in Table 1. The trend
growth rate was just under 3 per cent per annum
over the first part of the 19th century, dipped to
just under 2+ per cent per annum in the middle
and ended at just over 3 per cent. The average
growth rate over the whole century was virtually
identical to the 2.7 per cent per annum achieved
over the period of nearly three decades following
the second world war (1946-73). (Taking account
of the last three or four years stagnation, the
1946-76 rate would be somewhat lower, probably
2.3 per cent per anum).
Table 1
until 1901-Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, British
Economic Growth
20th century--calculated from British Econo,ny-Key
Statistics 1900-1966 and recent N1ESR reports.
In contrast with this slow, long haul of growth,
redistribution of personal incomes has been
quantitatively signficant only in this century.
Although there appear to have been minor im-
provements in the distribution of income in the
quarter-century or so before 1914, when the basis
I Over the last few years, rapid inflation and various controls
in incomes and profits appear to have brought other changes
in distribution-though it is too early to assess reliably the
extent of these or how permanent they will be.
British Economic Growth-long term
(average annual percentage increase)
Year Real GNP
growth rates
Real GNP
per capita
1700-1745 0.3 0.3
1745-1785 0.9 0.3
1780-1800 1.8 0.3
1801/1 1-1831/41 2.9 1.5
181 1/21-1841/51 2.9 1.4
1821/31-1851/61 2.3 0.4
1831/41-1861/71 2.2 0.4
1841/51-1871/71 2.5 1.4
1851/61-1881/91 3.2 2.0
1861/71-1891/1901 3.3 2.2
1901-1913 0.9 0.1
1921 -1937 2.1 1.7
1938-1946 1.5 1.7
1946-1956 2.4 1.5
1956- 1966 2.8 2.1
1966-1973 2.8 2.4
19th century average 2.7 1.4
1946-1973 2.7 2.0
Source:
for further changes was laid, the one major
improvement in the last two centuries occurred in
the two decades between the mid-1930s and the
early I 950s. Over this period both pre-tax and post-
tax income distribution improved substantially-
the result of a marked reduction in unemployment
and the introduction of a range of welfare state
measures following the Second World War.2
Britain's comparative standing with other devel-
oped countries in respect to post war income
distribution can be judged from Table 2.
Table 2
Distribution of Post-Tax Income in OECD Countries
(percentage share of personal incomes by quintile groups)
Because only limited changes in the distribution
of personal incomes occurred before the second
world war, one must not assume that distribution
in other respects has not changed. Income by
factor shares has shifted markedly over the last
two centuries. From the beginning of the 19th
century to post second world war, the share of
national income from all forms of rent declined
dramatically. Rents were some 20 per cent of
2 Soltow, (1968) summarises the statistical evidence on ncome
inequality in Britain, inevitably based on partial and occasion-
ally fairly reliable data. The estimates show that the Gins
coefficient of income distribution remained between 0.56
and 0.50 for the two centuries up to 1913 compared with
0.34 in 1962/3. Soltow's judgement on the changes between
the periods for which data are available are as follows:
1688-1801/3 no change in inequality.
1801/3-1867/80 probably no change, just possibly
some reduction.
1867/80-1911/13 certainly no increase, possibly 10
per cent reduction.
1911/13-1962/3 substantial decrease in inequality.
Besides these changes in overall inequality, upper tail income
tax data show evidence of continuous decline in inequality
between 1801, 1911/12 and 1962/3.
The more recent evidence is summarised in the report of the
Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth,
in R. J. Nicholson (1967), and B. Abel-Smith, and Townsend,(1965). Note that within the limitaticns of the data, most
analysts agree that poverty and inequality were both signi-
ficantly reduced over the decade or two until the early1950s-but that it is much more doubtful whether the pro-
cess has continued thereafter.
national income in 1801 hut had fallen to 4 per
cent by 1948/57. Moreover, the share of profits,
interest and mixed incomes halved from about
40 per cent to about 24 per cent over the same
period (21 per cent by 1966, even lower in the
last few years), though all of the latter decline
took place during this century. In contrast em-
ployment incomes have increased-from some 44
per cent of national income in 1801 to some 73
per cent in 1966.
In terms of the living standards and styles of
Source: OECD. Public Expenditure on Income Maintenance Programmes, OECD, Paris, July, 1976, p.109
both the rich and the really poor, these have
meant significant changes. From the beginning
of the 20th century, for example, the share of
home-rents had fallen from about 9 per cent of
national income to about 3 per cent, largely
reflecting rent controls and subsidised council
housing. The gradual build up of unemployment
relief and state pensions beginning with the
Liberal reforms of 1906-14 were tremendously
significant.3 On the other side, so to speak,
domestic service which formed 5 to 6 per cent of
recorded output at the end of the 19th century
has virtually disappeared in recent years (though
it has been partly replaced by household equip-
ment and non-household services). There is
certainly no cause for complacency in the present
crisis, with the threats it holds for the social
services and the capacity or willingness of govern-
ment to restore high rates of employment and
effective welfare state policies, the two pillars
on which the positive post war gains in income
distribution rested. Nevertheless, the dramatic
improvements over the extremes of poverty and
inequality in earlier times should be recognised.
3 A good summary is available in Hay, 1975.
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Year Bottom
20%
Middle
60%
Top
2Ø%
Total Rollo rop to
bol/orn 20
Australia 66/7 6.6 54.6 38.8 100.0 5.9
Canada 69 5.0 54.0 41.0 100.0 8.2
France 70 4.3 48.8 46.9 100.0 10.9
Germany 73 6.5 47.4 46.1 100.0 7.1
Italy 69 5.1 48.4 46.5 100.0 9.1
Japan 69 7.9 51. 1 41.0 100.0 5.2
Netherlands 67 6.5 50.6 42.9 100.0 6.6
Norway 70 6.3 56.4 37.3 100.0 5.9
Spain 73/4 6.0 51.7 42.3 100.0 7.1
Sweden 72 6.6 56.4 37.0 100.0 5.6
United Kingdom 73 6.3 55.0 38.7 100,0 6.1
United States 72 4.5 52.6 42.9 100.0 9.5
Average 5.9 52.3 41.8 100.0 7.1
International changes
Internationally, too, the recorded changes in net
inflows of income and outflows of investment
represent a very considerable contrast with the
earlier position. Net inflows of income from
abroad rose from about 1 per cent of GNP in
the early 19th century to 7 or 8 per cent at the
end and during the decade or so before the first
world war. Thereafter net inflows of income from
abroad have declined-to about 6 per cent of
GNP in the 1920s, 5 per cent in the 1930s, 3
per cent immediately after the second world
war and just over 1 per cent in the last two
decades. More or less in parallel with this rise and
fall, (but with considerable fluctuations) net
foreign investment rose from 3 per cent of GNP
in 1861 to nearly 7 per cent in 1911, thereafter
declining sharply, at times to the extent of net
dis-investment or net capital inflows into Britain
in the l930s and afterwards.4 Over the whole
period, net outflows of foreign investment have
always been somewhat lower than inflows of net
income from abroad although in recent years
Britain has begun to pay its own way to a degree
not seen for 100 years, if then.
The real signficance of these changing inter-
national relationships is indicated, however, less
by the statistical 'shift' in income or investment
flows than by the broader changes of political
and economic institutions and structures which
have influenced the pattern and terms on which
international trade and investment takes place.
The existence of the Empire and colonies meant
that an important part of British trade and com-
mercial involvement abroad was built up in
secure and protected markets-protected through
language, contacts and political influence, as well
as by direct imperial preferences. The end of this
structure and the earlier loss of Britain's tech-
nological lead removed many, though by no
means all, of these important advantages. Part
of Britain's post war difficulties have been the
result of a forced adjustment to an international
context in which Britain has had to compete
economically as never before.
The future implications-for unemployment
How important is it to change these patterns for
the future? Or put another way, how important
4 One can never be entirely sure of the meaningfulness of
long term changes in recorded foreign exchange flows, since
the prices and components on which they depend reflect
structures and institutions which themselves may be chang-
ing. Britain's position as both a base for and host to the
operations of international firms is especially significant in
the area of investment and income flows, some of which
may be unrecorded.
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are growth and redistribution for tackling
Britain's current economic difficulties and achiev-
ing her long run objectives?
In order to keep the discussion to a reasonable
length, I will consider the question in relation to
unemployment, which, together with inflation, is
the most critical problem of the British economy
today.
In Britain, as in several OECD countries, the
rate of unemployment in 1976 was almost double
the average of 1962-73g (Table 3).
Table 3-Unemployment ratesa in OECD countries
Average
a Standardised to international definitions
b Representing about 90% of OECD, including Australia.
Finland, Norway, Spain and Sweden as well as
countries listed above.
Source: National Institute Economic Review, 80, May
1977, p.29
At first sight-and still conventionally accepted
by most analyses in Britain today-growth is
the critical ingredient for expanding employment.
For example, the NIESR analysis published in
February, 1977, estimated that to reduce unem-
ployment from 1.4 mn. to a full employment
level of about 0.5 mn. "would need an increase
of some 9 per cent in GDP-this it must be
stressed, in addition to the increase of approach-
ing 3 per cent per annum (reflecting the growth
of output per head, together with the rather rapid
increase in the labour force expected over the
next five years) required merely to halt the rise
in unemployment. Thus to return to full employ-
ment in five years, for example, would require an
annual growth rate over the period of nearly
5 per cent". (National Institute Economic Review,
1977: 51).
The fact that even 5 per cent might be very diffi-
cult to attain-it is nearly double the rate of
growth achieved over any significant period in
Britain over the last two centuries-should itself
be sufficient to suggest that to rely primarily
5 Appalling as the current level of unemployment in Britain
may be, it is worth noting that in no less than 25 years of
the present century, the rate of unemployment has beenhigher than the current rate, and in two-thirds of them,double the 1976 rate.
1962-73 1974 1975 1976
United States 4,6 5.4 8.3 7.5
Canada 5.1 5.4 7.0 7.1
Japan 1.2 1.4 2.0 2.1
France 2.2 2.7 4.1 4.0
West Gertiiany 0.6 1.5 3.6 4.0
Italy 3.5 3.1 3.6 3.9
United Kingdom 3.1 2.9 4.5 6,0
Totalb 2.8 3.3 5.1 5.2
upon growth to solve the unemployment problem
is, to say the least, unsatisfactory.
Yet the same conclusion can be readand in fact
has now become the 'conventional wisdom'-
from the experience of many developing coun-
tries, where even growth at rates of 5 or 6 per
cent per annum has usually proved inadequate
to ensure more than marginal increases in wage
earning employment, let alone decreases in unem-
ployment.6
If we applied to Britain the lesson of recent em-
ployment studies in the Third World, we would
emphasise structural factors among the main
causes of unemployment, and structural change
rather than growth as the critical need. A struc-
tural approach in this context would need to
cover two sets of issuesl. analysis of the under-
lying trends and problems of the economy, em-
phasing structural factors in the pattern and com-
ponents of production, technological change, con-
sumption, external linkages, etc, not simply
relationships between the aggregates of total
demand; investment, consumption, etc. and 2. a
disaggregated analysis of unemployment itself,
emphasising the different factors bearing on the
unemployment problems of youth, women, older
persons, etc. Both elements have been recognised
as essential for the effective understanding of
employment problems in Third World countries
and of policies to tackle them,
A structural approach to policy would take one
into a wide range of issues, many absent from the
mainstream debate on employment policy in
Britain: the pattern of technological advance and
the need for a major shift of policy towards the
small producers; integrated local development
schemes with more central support for local
planning; a more selective approach to foreign
investment; a radical change of policy towards
informal sector services and methods of produc-
tion; changes in education; incomes policy; a
restructuring of government revenue and expendi-
ture with employment objectives in mind. Each
of these and some other areas of policy would,
of course, need to be expanded and analysed at
length as, for instance, was done in the ILO
report on Increasing Productive Employment in
Kenya (from the summary chapter of which the
above headings were taken). One would also
need to consider the influences on labour force
6 See, for example, the ILO employment missions to Colombia(1970) Sri Lanka (1971) and Kenya (1972), in which mem-bers of the IDS were heavily involved. Several years ago
it was suggested that the ILO might send an employment
mission to Britain. Unfortunately little official interest wa
shown in this interesting idea.
supply: population growth, changing participation
rates particularly of women (which have been
rising), retirement policy and the whole set of
factors determining the composition of the labour
force.
The key point is that an employment policy built
up from such a structural analysis would differ
fundamentally from one emphasising GNP ex-
pansion. Growth would probably still be involved
but it would be growth implied by the specifics
of strategy to reach and maintain full employ-
ment and meet other social and economic objec-
tives, rather than an aggregate goal from which
the resources required to meet other economic
objectives might hopefully be financed. And the
specifics of these other social and economic
objectives and of how to attain them would need
to be made a central part of the debate on econo-
mic and employment policy, not left peripheral
to it.
Slructural change and the problem of poverty
Such an approach would raise immediately the
problem of poverty, clearly related to the prob-
lem of unemployment but conceptually distinct.
(Indeed Third World analyses have emphasised
that the two problems ought generally to be con-
sidered together, both foranalytical and policy
making purposes.) Some 7 to 13 per cent of the
British population are estimated to fall below
'the poverty line' (as variously defined), less than
in several other OECD countries but still un-
reasonably high (Table 4). Yet the amount by
which their incomes in total fall short of the
poverty line is only small, barely I per cent of
GNP. The same is true, according to recent
OECD reports, for a number of OECD countries
(OECD, 1976). Long run growth is hardly a
necessary and certainly not a sufficient condition
to fill a gap of this size.
More significant, it is not clear that growth alone
will even assist with the matter. According to
the OECD study, for instance, expenditure on
income maintenance programmes over the decade
until 1972 rose nearly three times as fast as per
capita income in Britain, yet poverty remained.
In large part, this was because of widespread
'leakages' which meant that most of the resources
provided for income maintenance went to per-
sons other than the poor or, if they did reach
the poor, were offset by other reductions in their
incomes. Some 8 per cent of GNP was spent on
income maintenance but only a fraction helped
the poor. Again, the eradication of poverty in
Britain, as in most of the other industrialised
countries, is a matter of structural changes which
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will deal with the causes of this poverty, not just
more money: the issue is not really one of GNP.
Table 4Percentages of population below 'poverty line' in
various OECD countries and expenditure on income
maintenance programmes, in early 1970s
Per cent of national
Source: OECD op. cit. Table 27 and 1.
Employment patternsthe wider issues
The increasing need in Britain, as in most of the
richer OECD countries, is to provide an environ-
ment for a richer and' fuller life for all groups
and classes within the country, not just in material
terms, but in respect of a range of activities, self
fulfilment, family life and social interaction, of
freedom of choice and active participation
whether at work or in leisure.
Each of us probably has our own pet hobby
horses in respect of the new elements we would
like to see in this remodelled world. With regard
to employment, mine include complete flexibility
after the age of 15 with respect to education,
work and retirement patterns, with the ability to
shift periodically between all three (including in
and out of temporary periods of 'retirement' for
men and women over one's lifetimeand tapering
rather than complete retirement for older per-
sons); more flexible housing patterns freeing
people to move and change jobs more easily; and
a better balanced and more conscious integration
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of small scale and informal employment oppor-
tunities for providing everyday goods and services
with large scale production and provision only
where really essential.
This is not the place to expand further on these
points, let alone to suggest that these ideas are
the most important of the many that would
need to be drawn upon and worked out politi-
cally, socially and economically into a new pattern
of development. The critical point is simply that
such changes, if set in motion, would put the
emphasis on structural change, rather than
growth. Growth, as conventionally measured,
might or might not increase. This would almost
be beside the point. The ability of people to
choose, to participate, to lead fuller lives, to do
more of the things which prove really satisfying
would have increased. Against achievements of
this sort, 5 per cent growth seems totally
inadequate as a goal, and almost irrelevant as the
means to achieve such change.
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